The Effects of Targeted Learning Support: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design by Eielsen, Gaute
The Eﬀects of Targeted
Learning Support
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
Gaute Eielsen
Supervisor:
Prof. Edwin Leuven
Master of Philosophy in Economics
Department of Economics
University of Oslo
May, 2014
i
The Eﬀects of Targeted Learning Support
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
ii
© Gaute Eielsen
2014
The Eﬀects of Targeted Learning Support:
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
Gaute Eielsen
http://www.duo.uio.no
Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo
iii
Preface
This thesis is part of the ongoing evaluation of the Ny GIV initiative ﬁnanced by the
Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research. I extend the regression discontinuity analysis
in Eielsen et al. (2013), the ﬁrst of two evaluation reports for the Ministry, building on the
analyses presented in that report. In the evaluation I held responsibility for the regression
discontinuity analysis in close cooperation with Lars J. Kirkebøen. I am very grateful to
Kirkebøen for his mentoring in applied research. I am also very grateful to my supervisor
Edwin Leuven for his support and excellent supervision throughout the process. I would
also like to thank my colleagues and fellow investigators on the evaluation project Marte
Rønning and Oddbjørn Raaum, and the Ministry of Education and Science for comments on
previous work. My family and friends also deserve a big thanks for the support they oﬀered
throughout a period of absent-mindedness on my part. And last but not least, thanks to
Cormac Mangan, for great help and jokes at the end. I am responsible for any errors or
omissions.
Gaute Eielsen, Oslo, May 2014
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Abstract
This thesis evaluates the short-term eﬀects of a Norwegian policy that aims to increase upper
secondary education completion rates. The evaluated program provides learning support to
low-performing students at the end of lower secondary school, seeking to improve their basic
skills in reading, writing and numeracy. The explicit target group of the program is the
bottom ten percent in the average grade distribution. However, the assignment rule has been
interpreted diﬀerently, creating institution-speciﬁc thresholds that determine the participa-
tion oﬀers to the students. I develop an approach to identify these thresholds that may also
prove useful for other evaluations of targeted policies where lower level administrative units
have implemented rules independently. For a relatively small sample the necessary assump-
tions for a regression discontinuity design are credible. I ﬁnd no evidence of eﬀects from the
program.
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1 Introduction
Low upper secondary school completion rates are a persistent cause of concern amongst
policymakers in most high-income countries. Currently, one in four young people in OECD
countries will not have passed one kind of upper secondary school by their 25th birthday
(OECD, 2013).1 Failure to complete secondary education comes at a great cost to both
the individual and the society at large (Oreopoulos, 2007). For the individual, not only do
lifetime earnings increase with additional schooling, there are also a number of nonpecuniary
eﬀects of education such as making better decisions about health, marriage and parenting
style (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011).
In Norway there has also been a growing concern over low and late completion. The
share of a cohort completing secondary education within 5 years of ﬁnishing lower secondary
school has been relatively stable at around 70 percent over the last decade.2 The average rate
however diﬀer substantially by earlier performance as measured by ﬁnal assessment grades at
the end of lower secondary school. For the 10 percent lowest-performing students the average
completion rate has been relatively stable at 16 percent over the last 6 years.3 For the second
and third deciles the corresponding ﬁgures are 35 and 50 percent, while for the top half of
the distribution 90 percent have completed within 5 years. This association between earlier
performance and the probability of completion is also found for the US, the UK and New
Zealand (Falch et al., 2011).
In 2010 the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Science initiated several policies under
the name Ny GIV to increase upper secondary completion rates.4 A central part of the
initiative, studied in this paper, is a remedial program targeting low-performing students
at the end of their 10th academic year, the last compulsory year in school. Speciﬁcally the
target group was the 10 percent lowest-performing students as judged by their ﬁrst term GPA
in 10th grade. The program aimed to increase basic skills in reading, writing and numeracy,
and is generally implemented as adapted instruction in smaller groups. This is a substitute
to ordinary classes, extra instruction time is not added.
This thesis analyzes the implementation and eﬀects of the remedial program on short-
term academic outcomes and progress through the ﬁrst two years of upper secondary. Doing
1There are a number of diﬃculties comparing completion rates across countries and the share by some
age is the most comparable. Problems still remain with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of completion across countries
and very diﬀerent age proﬁles for completion. For a discussion see Lyche (2010).
2The theoretical duration for the academic and vocational study tracks is 3 and 4 years, respectively.
3Figure A.1 shows these completion rates using the complete cohorts ﬁnishing lower secondary school the
years 2002-2007.
4The Ministry set a target of increasing the overall 5 year completion rate to 75 percent within year 2015
(Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2013).
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so, I make two contributions to the literature. First, I develop an approach to ﬁnd unknown
cutoﬀs varying between units (here, schools or municipalities) for assignment to treatment.
The program is explicitly targeted towards the lowest-performing 10 percent. However, this
has been interpreted diﬀerently by diﬀerent schools and municipalities, resulting in some
schools having no clear cutoﬀ. Other schools have cutoﬀs at unknown values of ﬁrst term
GPA, which can in turn be deﬁned in diﬀerent ways. The search procedure builds on the
same idea used when looking for structural breaks in time-series econometrics, and is used
by Card et al. (2008) to ﬁnd tipping points in neighborhood population ﬂows. However,
to my knowledge, it has not previously been applied in the context of a policy evaluation.
Although the search procedure should be considered work in progress, this application may
prove useful in contexts where there exist rules that are open to diﬀerent interpretations by
diﬀerent administrative units, resulting in eﬀective variation in the assignment thresholds
across units. Through employing a method to convincingly identify the rule applied, then it
may still be possible to draw inferences in these contexts that were previously regarded as
too messy.
The second contribution is to use the identiﬁed threshold in a sub-sample of schools to
estimate the causal eﬀect of the remedial program on the outcomes of interest.
The evaluation compares students just below and a above a certain cutoﬀ value in the
ﬁrst term grade point average (GPA) distribution. The idea being that while the students just
above this cutoﬀ have a much lower probability of receiving the intervention, they are similar
in both observed and unobserved characteristics to those just below, and therefore qualify as a
valid control group. Participation in the program is voluntary, therefore actually receiving the
treatment is not a deterministic function of the ﬁrst term GPA. This data generating process
is what is known in the literature as a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). It depends
on two crucial elements; the ﬁrst is what generates the design: That actual implementation
in the schools caused a discontinuity in the probability of receiving the treatment at some
value of the ﬁrst term GPA. The second is the key identifying assumption, ﬁrst formalized in
Hahn et al. (2001), that the potential outcomes are continuous in GPA at the discontinuity.
In other words, there are no other factors that change discontinuously at the cutoﬀ other than
the diﬀerence in treatment probability. This assumption might seem strong, but the appeal
of a regression-discontinuity design over other non-experimental evaluation strategies, such
as diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and (other types of) instrumental variable approaches, is that the
implied local randomization can be veriﬁed much in the same way as a randomized controlled
trial. Where in an experiment (globally) the observable characteristics should be balanced
between the treated and the control group, this should be the case locally for students below
and above the cutoﬀ in a RDD (Lee, 2008).
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If the identifying assumption holds, target group membership i.e. having a ﬁrst term GPA
equal to or lower than the cutoﬀ, can be used as a valid instrument for participation. If being
in the target group at least does not reduce the probability of participation (monotonicity),
and the instrument has no independent eﬀect on the outcomes (exclusion restriction), we
can identify the local average treatment eﬀect for the students who participate because they
are in the target group (the compliers) in the proximity of the cutoﬀ (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008).
The search procedure leads me to a sample of schools in the municipality of Stavanger,
where there is a clear discontinuity in treatment probability and the continuity assumption
seem to hold. For this sample I ﬁnd no evidence of eﬀects of the program on grades at the end
of the ﬁnal year of lower secondary school or in the ﬁrst year of upper secondary school. Nor
do I ﬁnd any evidence of impact on progression through upper-secondary school. However,
because of the limited precision, I cannot reject that there are eﬀects of economical interest
on these outcomes.
The thesis is structured as follows: In Section 2 I give a brief review of the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the institutional background, program studied, its participants,
the data sources and ﬁnally applies the search algorithm to identify assignment rules. Section
4 develops the empirical strategy and the eﬀect estimators. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results from the estimations, while Section 6 explain in further detail why I cannot ﬁnd
any eﬀects of the program, before Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
In the economic literature of life cycle skill formation outcomes such as academic achieve-
ment and educational attainment are often modelled as a function of a set of skills, eﬀort
and various purchased inputs.5 In this framework, social policies have an eﬀect on outcomes
by aﬀecting skills such as cognitive ability and motivation or the eﬀort of the student. In an
inﬂuential study Carneiro and Heckman (2003) review the empirical evidence of policies that
seek to improve various socioeconomic outcomes for disadvantaged children and adolescents
and conclude that 1) early interventions are more eﬀective than later interventions and 2)
that personality skills are more malleable at earlier ages and that these can be as important
determinants of later outcomes as cognitive skills.6 There is a growing consensus that aca-
demic achievement and graduation rates are among the outcomes most eﬀectively improved
5For a recent review see Heckman and Mosso (2014).
6Cognitive skills include such skills as memory and processing of new information while personality skills
are among the noncognitive skills found to be important determinants of future socioeconomic outcomes.
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by early interventions (Cook et al., 2014),7 but there are a limited number of studies of
remedial programs targeting adolescents that ﬁnd positive impacts.
Lavy and Schlosser (2005) investigate the eﬀect of providing individualized extra teach-
ing to small groups of low-performing upper secondary students, ﬁnding that this increases
graduation rates by 3.3 percentage points at the school level, implying an improvement of 6
percent.
De Haan (2012) studies a Dutch remedial program where schools get additional funding
for each low-performing student. Non-parametrically bounding the eﬀect she ﬁnds that
graduation rates increase by at least 4 percentage points and reading and math performance
also improve.
Perhaps most closely related to this study, Cortes et al. (2013) investigate an algebra
policy implemented in Chicago in 2003 where students with achievement below the national
median on an eighth grade exam in mathematics are assigned to algebra courses with double
instructional time in ninth grade. Using a regression discontinuity design, they ﬁnd sizable
eﬀects of the double-dosing in algebra on high school graduation rates, college entrance exam
scores, and college enrollment rates. The intervention was most successful for students with
relatively low reading skills.
Finally, a recent randomized experiment of an intervention that combines behavioral ther-
apy with individualized academic remediation to 9th and 10th graders, also in Chicago public
high schools, ﬁnds surprisingly large eﬀects. Maths grades are reported to have improved by
0.67 of a control group standard deviation, and the expected graduation rate increased by
14 percentage points. Although it remains to be seen if these eﬀects can be reproduced in
the ongoing scaling up of the program, the cost-eﬀectiveness of this program is much better
than most other interventions targeting adolescents (Cook et al., 2014).
There is a large literature that more indirectly sheds light on the potential impacts of the
program. The program implies a reduction in class size for both treated students and the
remaining students in the cohort, which has been studied intensively empirically. Hanushek
(1997) concludes in an inﬂuential review of this literature that there is not consistent evidence
of positive impacts from a reduction of class-size, while Krueger (2003) reviews the same
evidence concluding that there is a subtle positive impact. In a Norwegian context Leuven
et al. (2008) ﬁnd no eﬀects on lower secondary school performance. Fredriksson et al. (2013)
study the long-term eﬀects of smaller class size over the last three years of primary school in
Sweden and ﬁnd that it not only improves non-cognitive and cognitive ability at age 16, but
also improves secondary school completion rates and adult earnings. The intervention also
7Cook et al. (2014) argue, however, that this conclusion might be premature based on their ﬁndings.
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changes the classroom composition, which can have a causal eﬀect (Leuven and Rønning,
2011; Van Ewijk and Sleegers, 2010; Duﬂo et al., 2011). Additionally the ministry intended
to change the pedagogy used. Similar interventions have been found to improve student
outcomes in primary schools in England and India (Machin and McNally, 2008; Banerjee
et al., 2007). Related to this, the curriculum also changed which, according to Cortes et al.
(2013), can have a positive eﬀect. Finally, in a Norwegian context, Falch et al. (2013) study
the eﬀect of randomly assigned exam subjects on performance and subsequent educational
choices. They ﬁnd a substantial eﬀect of being assigned to mathematics, and argue that the
eﬀect of short-term (in this case only three to six days) intensive and focused training can
be large.
3 Background
In Norway, compulsory schooling encompasses 10 grades. Student starts school at age 6,
and leave compulsory school the year they turn 16. After compulsory school most students
continue to upper secondary school. Upper secondary education has diﬀerent tracks. Some
of these tracks are academic, generally consisting of three years in school and intended to
prepare students for further studies. A second path is vocational, generally consisting of two
years in school followed by two years as an apprentice, leading to a certiﬁcate of apprentice-
ship. While not compulsory, students have a right to attend upper secondary school, and
almost all students enroll in upper secondary school. However, the share completing upper
secondary within ﬁve years of enrollment has for several years been stable at about 70 percent
(Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2013). Completion in this context means obtaining a diploma from
upper secondary school.
3.1 The program
The program's Norwegian name Overgangsprosjektet, translated the Transition Project,
reveals the objective of easing the transition from lower to upper secondary school for the
targeted students. The Ministry of Education and Science explicitly stated that the lowest-
performing ten percent in terms of ﬁrst term grades within each municipality are the target
group. These students are considered at high risk of dropping out before the end of the
remaining 3 or 4 years of their secondary education.8
The lack of basic skills in literacy, writing and numeracy for these students are thought to
8See Figure A.1 for completion rates within 5 years of using the complete cohorts ﬁnishing lower secondary
school the years 2002-2007.
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be the key reason for the low completion rates. Thus, to prepare for upper secondary, instead
of following the regular curriculum in regular classes, these students are taught these basic
skills in smaller groups. However, while the intervention changes the classroom composition
and possibly the methods and content of the teaching, training in basic skills is intended to
replace instruction time in the corresponding subject, and thus not supposed to change the
relative time spent across subjects.
The intensive learning support was rolled out in three waves starting in the spring of 2011,
each encompassing approximately one third of all students. The second and third waves were
rolled out in the spring of 2012 and 2013 respectively, thus by spring 2013 all lower secondary
schools in Norway were actively participating in the program.
In a letter from the Ministry describing the intervention, the schools were given substantial
freedom in how to implement the program, but some features are still shared across schools.
To describe the nature of the program I rely on survey responses from the principals after
the ﬁrst year, reported in Sletten et al. (2011). The response rate for the principals was 88
percent. Students and teachers (both those teaching intensive training lessons and others)
were also surveyed, but the response was lower at approximately 30 and 40 percent of the
populations. For this reason I use mainly responses from the principals in the following.
In the average school 12 students were oﬀered the program and 10 of these accepted the
oﬀer. In most schools the program acted as a substitute to regular classes and typically
accounted for about 6 to 7 hours of the 30-hour school week. In a minority of schools the
targeted students also received classes in addition to the 30-hour school week. The average
duration was 13 weeks, with a minimum of ten weeks and maximum of 18 weeks. There was
some variation across schools in which skills the students received training; 80 percent of the
participants received training in literacy and writing; 90 percent in numeracy; such that 70
percent received training in all three competencies. In 95 percent of the schools the students
were taught outside of the regular class in smaller groups. In smaller schools all students in
the program were mainly kept in one group, while in larger schools about half decided to
split into groups depending on the competency being taught.
The group size was typically 10 students, but with much variation across schools. Among
the responding teachers many had previous experience with teaching low-performing stu-
dents. Furthermore, as a part of the program selected teachers received ﬁve days training
focusing on teaching such students. The surveyed teachers state that they adapted their
teaching to ﬁt the challenges of the targeted students, and the extra training is reported to
have strengthened the ability of the teachers to increase the students' motivation.
While the program targeted the lowest-performing students, it also aﬀected the other
students. The consequences for the remaining students was a temporary reduction in class
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size, reduced within-class heterogeneity in terms of performance and possibly a reallocation
of teaching resources. The majority of teachers who themselves did not teach in the program
reported that it was easier to provide lessons to the remaining students. Only a minority of
the teachers reported that the regular classes suﬀered in terms of teacher resources in the
program period. Except for the ﬁve-day training there were no additional resources provided
to the schools during the program from the Ministry. However, about half the principals
responding said they received additional funds supplied by the municipalities to hire teachers
in relation to the project. There is no information of whether these funds covered the extra
cost of the teachers needed to carry out the program, or how the schools who did not receive
these funds managed to supply the necessary teachers.
The larger initiative also involved other initiatives in upper secondary school. Notably, the
responsibilities of school and other public agencies to follow up students at risk of dropping
out were clariﬁed. However, this does not impact the validity of identiﬁcation as these policies
are not exclusive to the participants of the intensive training. The later interventions should,
nevertheless, be taken into account when interpreting the external validity of the eﬀects, as
these could be conditional on an environment where struggling students have extra resources
available.
3.2 Data
I use administrative register data from Statistics Norway, covering the complete cohorts of
lower secondary graduates of 2003 through 2011 for this analysis. The intensive learning
support was rolled out in three waves starting in the spring of 2011, as explained above. This
means that I can study the achievement and progression of the ﬁrst wave of the program.
The data will later be extended with more cohorts. Each cohort consists of roughly 60 000
students. For these students all ﬁrst-term and ﬁnal grades from lower secondary school are
available, as well as information on their transition from lower secondary to upper secondary
and their progress through upper secondary school. Individual-level data on participation in
the program has been collected by NOVA, as part of their mappings of the program (Sletten
et al. (2011)). The mean, standard deviations and the number of observations are presented
in Table 1 for all observations. Further details on the variables are in the notes.
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Table 1: Summary statistics wave 1
Mean SD N
Characteristics
Share female 0.479 0.500 18084
Mother's schooling 13.036 3.926 17189
Father's schooling 12.744 4.100 16454
Share immigrant 0.077 0.266 18084
Share immigrant parents 0.074 0.261 18084
Prior achievement
Avg. on 8th grade tests -0.016 0.897 17182
GPA 1st term 3.817 0.806 17689
Math grade 1st term 3.391 1.166 17314
Norwegian grade 1st term 3.679 0.962 17007
Achievement
GPA teacher grades 4.000 0.842 17918
Written exam grade 3.471 1.155 17122
On-time enrollment 1st year 0.972 0.164 18038
On-time completion 1st year 0.790 0.407 18038
GPA upper sec. 36.476 11.425 17405
On-time enrollment 2nd year 0.838 0.368 18038
Notes. GPA 1st term is the average of all subject grades (for most students this is 12 grades) set by the
students' teachers at the end of the ﬁrst term of 10th grade. Math and Norwegian grades make up two of the
grades in GPA 1st term. Avg. on 8th grade tests is the average of three standardized grades from a national
exam in 8th grade in English, Norwegian and Maths. Mother's and Father's schooling are the number of
years of schooling of the mother and father of the student, respectively. Share female/immigrant/immigrant
parents are all dummy variables equal to one if the student is female, an immigrant or has immigrant parents,
respectively. The enrollment and completion variables equals one if the student has enrolled or completed,
respectively; zero otherwise. GPA teacher grades is the average of all grades (for most 13 grades) set by the
students' teachers at the end of lower secondary school (10th grade). Written exam grade is the average of
the three exams most students undertake in English, Maths and Norwegian. GPA upper sec. is the average
of all grades the ﬁrst year of upper secondary school multiplied by ten.
3.3 First wave participants
The target group of the program was the 10 percent lowest-scoring students in each munic-
ipality as per ﬁrst term GPA (Sletten et al., 2011). Table 2, which compares participating
students with other students in the participating schools, shows that these diﬀer from the re-
maining students. The participating students have lower ﬁrst term performance, in particular
in Maths, are more likely to be boys and have a more adverse family background.
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Table 2: Comparison of participant and other students in the ﬁrst wave schools
(1) (2) (3)
Participants Non-participants Diﬀerence
mean/sd mean/sd b/se
GPA 1st term 2.863 3.840 -0.977∗∗
(0.592) (0.957) (0.015)
Missing grades 1st term 0.013 0.023 -0.010∗∗
(0.112) (0.150) (0.003)
Math grade 1st term 2.178 3.543 -1.365∗∗
(0.658) (1.126) (0.018)
Norwegian grade 1st term 2.767 3.792 -1.025∗∗
(0.712) (0.928) (0.018)
Avg. on 8th grade tests -0.806 0.081 -0.887∗∗
(0.677) (0.872) (0.017)
Share female 0.404 0.488 -0.084∗∗
(0.491) (0.500) (0.012)
Mother's schooling 11.287 13.244 -1.957∗∗
(4.169) (3.844) (0.102)
Father's schooling 11.209 12.921 -1.713∗∗
(3.962) (4.079) (0.102)
Share immigrant 0.129 0.070 0.059∗∗
(0.336) (0.256) (0.008)
Share immigrant parents 0.123 0.068 0.055∗∗
(0.328) (0.251) (0.008)
Observations 1972 16112 18084
Notes. Mean values of each characteristic are shown in column (1) and (2) for participants and non-
participants, respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Column (3) tests each diﬀerence with
Welch's t-test, allowing for the diﬀerence in sample size and variance. Data are for the students in schools
included in the program the ﬁrst year (the ﬁrst wave). Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate the
signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05).
Although the program targeted the bottom ten percent, there is a lot of variation in
program participation across the average grades distribution. Figure 1 shows how the share
of participants varies over the municipality-speciﬁc distribution of ﬁrst term GPA.9 This
shows that schools were using other criteria than the average ﬁrst term grade alone to select
students to the program.
9Figure A.2 in the appendix shows the ﬁrst term GPA distribution for all students and the participating
students.
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Figure 1: Program participation conditional on 1st term average grade
Notes. The x-axis shows the percentile rank, i.e. the percentage of average grades that
are the same or lower, in the 1st term average grade distribution of each municipality.
The solid circle indicates the percentage of participants missing 1st term grades. The
hollow circles shows the mean percentage of studens participating conditional on the
percentile rank point. On the vertical line and to the left are the 10 percent lowest-
scoring pupils in each municipality. Also added is a ﬁt estimated with a local linear
regression weighted using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 2 percentile rank
points. Data are for the students in schools included in the program the ﬁrst year (the
ﬁrst wave).
Less than half of the target group, the 10 percent lowest-scoring students in each munici-
pality, actually participates in the program. Within the ﬁrst decile there is also variation, with
the maximum participation rate of 50 percent around the 10th percentile and the minimum
at 34 percent in the third. Estimating the conditional mean participation rate separately
below and above the 10th percentile reveals no diﬀerence. There is no clear discontinuity
either way.
There are several reasons why, in spite of the clear instruction from the Ministry, there is
no clear discontinuity in participation around the 10th percentile. First, while the students
should be selected based on ﬁrst term grades, no clear advice was given on what weights
should be attached to diﬀerent subjects. All subjects could be given equal weight (as in
Figure 1), or for example Maths and Norwegian grades could be given more weight, as some
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coordinators of the programs report.
Second, some students were already receiving diﬀerent kinds of special education. The
Ministry explicitly stated that in such cases the program should only be oﬀered if it was con-
sidered to be a better alternative. This seems unlikely given that these students already had
an individually adapted curriculum and teaching. About 11 percent of 10th grade students
have such individual programs. While these individuals cannot be identiﬁed in the data, they
are likely overrepresented among the low-performers.10 This may explain the relatively low
training incidence below the 10th percentile.
Ten percent of the students in the ﬁrst wave of the program participate in the train-
ing. This means, with some low-performing students not participating, that the schools
include higher-performing students. With diﬀerent shares of special needs students at diﬀer-
ent schools, this can therefore give rise to diﬀerent participation thresholds.
Finally, schools or municipalities may determine participation on other criteria. There is,
for example, anecdotal evidence that in some cases the selection of students for participation
was based on the eﬀect the teachers anticipated for a given student.
To conclude, some municipalities and schools probably chose students in a way that
produced no discontinuities in the probability of participation. In these cases participating
and non-participating students with similar ﬁrst term GPA are not systematically diﬀerent.
In the next section I detail how I identify schools and municipalities that assigned students
according to a local cutoﬀ.
3.4 Searching for cutoﬀs and strict implementation
The directive of the Ministry of Education and Science suggested that all students below the
10th percentile would receive a treatment oﬀer. For a given municipality, we can write this
formally as
d˜i = 1{gi ≤ τ10} (1)
where d˜i is the binary oﬀer variable, gi the ﬁrst term GPA of the student, τ10 the 10th per-
centile in the ﬁrst term GPA distribution. Participation di then depends on the participation
oﬀer d˜i as follows
di = γ0 + γ1d˜i + ui (2)
10The number of subjects a student receives grades in may be a proxy for individual programs. Studying
this, Eielsen et al. (2013) ﬁnd that there are students with fewer grades over the entire GPA distribution,
but that they are clearly overrepresented in the bottom. Furthermore, having few graded subjects reduces
the probability of participation in the intensive training program for given GPA .
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As explained above, municipalities could deviate from the 10th percentile rule, and use
another threshold (if any). There were also diﬀerent practices in terms of which grades
made up the average grade, with ﬁve speciﬁc combinations reported by the local program
administrators.11 To investigate this possibility, I estimate for each municipality equations
such as (2), while letting the threshold vary from the 1st to the 35th percentile in each of
the ﬁve GPA distributions. The threshold that predicts observed treatment most accurately
(the one with the highest R-squared), is then taken as the one the municipality applied.12
This forms a course, municipality and cohort-speciﬁc assignment variable, which for every
student is normalized to a cutoﬀ of 0.
The same procedure is repeated at the school level, using the GPA distributions at the
municipality level. This is to account for the possibility that there could be certain strict
schools within a municipality that adhere to a (potential) percentile rule of the municipality.
Figure A.3 in the appendix shows that the percentiles that best explain program partici-
pation diﬀer substantially, from the 5th to the 30th. For municipalities most fall in the range
from 10 to 25, while for schools there is wider dispersion. How well the best models explain
assignment also varies as shown in Figure A.5 (also in the appendix), but is overall rather
low: Most schools have a share of explained variation (R2) smaller than 0.6 and most mu-
nicipalities smaller than 0.4. Figure 2 categorizes units by the share of variation explained,
and shows program participation against the normalized assignment variable. There are clear
diﬀerences in the discontinuities both at the school and municipality level, with a much larger
drop for the strict municipalities.
11As part of the evaluation documented in Eielsen et al. (2013) we surveyed local administrators on their
assignment practice.
12If assignment is strict, all students below the nth percentile would participate and the model would
perfectly explain the variation in participation and thus yield an R2 of 1.
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Figure 2: Probability of participation by strictness category
Notes. The y-axis shows the share in the program. The x-axis shows the normalized
assignment variable for the best speciﬁcation for all units. The mean participation rate
for bins of 0.1 average grade-points is plotted at midpoints. In the upper panel the units
are schools, while in the lower there are municipalities. The units are categorized by
the share of variation explained. Not strict is deﬁned as having a R-squared from the
best speciﬁcation in the interval [0,0.25]. Similarly, for Somewhat strict the R-squared
is in the interval (0.25, 0.5], while for Quite strict in (0.5,1]
Among the municipalities Stavanger is the strictest, with an R-squared of 0.7. This
matches well with reports from local administrators, as well as the plot of individual students
in the schools in Figure 3. With the exception of one school (#9), the same municipality-
speciﬁc cutoﬀ at the 11th percentile predicts participation well. I therefore continue with the
ﬁrst cohort in Stavanger as my main estimation sample.13 Table 1 in the appendix shows the
summary statistics for this sample.
13As School 9 looks to have a diﬀerent practice I exclude that school from the sample. The R-squared
from the estimation of the cutoﬀ is the lowest in the municipality of Stavanger at 0.41. The results are not
sensitive to this exclusion.
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Figure 3: Assignment of students in Stavanger ﬁrst cohort
Notes. Each school in the ﬁrst wave of the program in Stavanger is plotted separately.
The y-axes of all graphs shows whether a student participate, with y equal to one;
zero otherwise. The x-axes shows the students' average ﬁrst term grades plotted with
some random noise (jitter) to show the relative weight of students along the axis. The
vertical line indicates the estimated cutoﬀ at the 11th percentile, or a GPA of 2.75.
Concerning the results from searching for school-speciﬁc cutoﬀ, I do ﬁnd some schools
that seem to have a reasonably strict assignment, as shown in Figure A.5 in the appendix. I
keep the schools with an R-squared larger than 0.5 as an alternative estimation sample for
further inspection. This sample does at least consist of some actual discontinuities, as many
of the strictest schools are found in Stavanger, but the algorithm can also have picked up
spurious cutoﬀs when iterating over the large number of schools.
4 Empirical strategy
The challenge in estimating the causal eﬀect of the intensive training program is address-
ing non-random selection into the program. Table 2 in the previous section showed that
participants are diﬀerent in many observable characteristics, including grades in Maths and
Norwegian, which is to be expected when the targeted group is the ﬁrst decile of the ﬁrst
term GPA distribution. Simply comparing students who attend with those who do not, will
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likely result in eﬀect estimates that are heavily downward biased.
To get credible causal eﬀect estimates, the main identiﬁcation strategy in this thesis relies
on a directive from the Ministry of Education and Science stating that the bottom 10 percent
of students should be oﬀered the program. Sletten et al. (2011) report that most students
accepted the program oﬀer. If municipalities follow the rule-based assignment then there is
a clear diﬀerence in the probability of participation across the cutoﬀ that we can exploit.
This section starts with a presentation of this identiﬁcation strategy, called the fuzzy
regression discontinuity (FRD) design, and continues with a discussion of the estimation. I
go on to assess whether the identifying assumptions are satisﬁed for these samples before
I continue with a discussion of potential spillovers from the program and implications for
the eﬀect estimates. I conclude this section with an outline of an alternative identiﬁcation
strategy.
4.1 The eﬀects of the intensive training program
The eﬀect of the intensive training on an outcome y, say GPA at the end of the ﬁrst year
of upper secondary school, for student i can conceptually be deﬁned by the diﬀerence in
potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974). Let yi(1) be the GPA for the student if she participates,
and yi(0) the GPA if she does not. The causal eﬀect of the program for this student is then
yi(1)− yi(0). Depending on a student's treatment status we either observe yi(0) or yi(1), but
never both. This is the fundamental problem of causal analysis, coined by Holland (1986).
The observed outcome, yi, can be written in terms of potential outcomes as follows:
yi = yi(0) + di(yi(1)− yi(0)) ≡ α + diβi + νi, (3)
where βi ≡ yi(1)−yi(0), α = E[yi(0)], νi = yi(0)−E[yi(0)] and di = 1 if student i participates,
and is zero otherwise. Although we cannot estimate unit level treatment eﬀects βi, we can
estimate average causal eﬀects by comparing treated and untreated students who are on
average identical.
The program was intended for the ten percent lowest-performing students as judged by
their ﬁrst term GPA in 10th grade, gi. Students would thus receive a treatment oﬀer if gi ≤ c,
where c is the 10th percentile of the ﬁrst term GPA distribution. Following (Hahn et al.,
2001), I now discuss how to recover causal eﬀects in the context of this treatment assignment
mechanism. The probability of participation given gi is deﬁned as Pr[di = 1 | gi = g]. The
ﬁrst requirement is that this probability is discontinuous at the 10th percentile cutoﬀ c:
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d− ≡ lim↑0Pr[di | gi = c+ ] 6= lim↓0Pr[di | gi = c+ ] ≡ d+ (4)
The main identifying assumption is that the only thing that changes at the cutoﬀ is
treatment. This implies that average potential outcomes do not jump at the cutoﬀ. More
formally:
Assumption 1. E[yi(0) | gi = g] and E[yi(1) | gi = g] are continuous at g0 = c.
This requires for example that students' average motivation does not change discontinu-
ously at the cutoﬀ. In practice the main threat to this assumption is that individuals sort
around the cutoﬀ. This may therefore seem like a strong assumption, but as long as there is
an element of chance determining the assignment variable then there will be no self-selection
close to the cutoﬀ, even if students prefer one side of the cutoﬀ over the other (Lee, 2008).
In the context of this study it seems plausible that there is a stochastic element to the ﬁrst
term average grade from the students' perspective, after all it depends on grading in several
courses on multiple tests by diﬀerent teachers. Schools may however sort students below or
above the cutoﬀ, perhaps based on perceived gains from the program. Assumption 1 implies
however that students just below and above the cutoﬀ should have the same predetermined
characteristics. This provides a local balance test similar to the (global) one conducted
between control and treated students in a randomized experiment. If sorting behavior by
students and schools depends on expected beneﬁts, and if we have access to predetermined
characteristics that correlate with potential outcomes, then this should show up in the balance
tests.
Now we can deﬁne a local intention to treat (ITT) parameter by looking at the diﬀerence
in average outcomes on both sides of the cutoﬀ c:
βITT = lim↑0E[yi | gi = c+ ]− lim↓0E[yi | gi = c+ ] ≡ y− − y+ (5)
With perfect compliance, i.e. all students oﬀered the program participated, this parameter
equals the local average treatment eﬀect.
With imperfect compliance, as is the case in this evaluation, Hahn et al. (2001) show
that as long as crossing the threshold has a monotonous eﬀect on treatment,14 then we can
identify the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) for the students induced to participate
by the instrument, the so-called compliers (Angrist et al., 1996). It can be shown that the
LATE is the ratio of the local ITT and the diﬀerence in treatment probability:
14This implies that there are no students who would not have participated with a a test score below the
threshold, but who would have participated with a test score above the threshold.
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βLATE =
y− − y+
d− − d+ = E[βi | student i is a complier, gi = c] (6)
Note that this is the average eﬀect of treatment for the sub-population that is 1) induced
into the treatment if their score gi falls below the threshold, and 2) has a GPA close to the
10th percentile in the distribution.
With heterogeneous eﬀects of the program, and without further assumptions, this eﬀect
estimand is thus not valid for students that would get into the program regardless of their
ﬁrst term grades, nor those that would always decline an oﬀer. This make intuitive sense
as there are likely reasons for why some students accept an oﬀer of participation and why
others do not. With maximizing students one would expect the compliers to perceive their
gains from treatment to be higher.
4.2 Estimation
The parameters derived above are the diﬀerence of the limits at each side of the cutoﬀ. In
practice there is however insuﬃcient data for such local estimation, and I will need to use
observations further away from the discontinuity in the estimations. In order to estimate the
LATE I need estimates of the denominator and the numerator in Equation (6). I estimate
the denominator, d− − d+, by regressing treatment di on target group membership d˜i:
di = µj0 + µj1d˜i + fj(gi) + uji (7)
where gi is now normalized to 0 at the cutoﬀ and d˜i = 1[gi ≤ 0]. The estimate for the
coeﬃcient µj1 is then the diﬀerence in probability of treatment in the sample, dˆ− − dˆ+.
This probability is allowed to diﬀer for the diﬀerent j outcomes studied, as the population
comprises of the students with non-missing values for each of the outcomes. To make sure
that I capture the jump at the cutoﬀ I need to control for a ﬂexible function of the running
variable fj(gi).
Similarly I can estimate y− − y+ by estimating:
yji = αj0 + αj1d˜i + hj(gi) + vi, (8)
where the coeﬃcient αj1 is the diﬀerence in sample averages of the observed outcomes at
each side of the cutoﬀ, yˆ− − yˆ+. This is interpreted separately as the estimator for the ITT
parameter in Equation (5).
Taking the ratio of these two estimates gives the estimate for the LATE, which is equiv-
alent to estimating the structural equation
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yji = βj0 + βj1dji +mj(gi) + εi, (9)
using two-stage least squares and instrumenting di with d˜i.15
The main challenge in practice is to specify the parametric models for the assignment
variable fj(·), hj(·) and mj(·), and because the identiﬁcation is ultimately local, the restric-
tion on the estimation sample around the cutoﬀ. The nonparametric regression of program
participation on the assignment variable for the main estimation sample, presented in the
ﬁrst graph in the upper left corner of Figure 4 below, suggests that a linear model on both
sides is a good approximation to fj(·). Similarly this also seems to be the case for hj(·),
judging the ﬁts in Figure 7. I will thus estimate local linear regressions allowing the slope
to diﬀer at each side of the discontinuity in all equations presented above. So speciﬁcally for
the structural equations, inserting for mj(gi) for a bandwidth choice b yields:
yji = βj0 + βj1dji + βj2gi + βj3gi · d˜+ εi for − b ≤ gi ≤ b (10)
and similarly for Equation (7) and (8).
In my preferred speciﬁcations I will use a bandwidth of 1 average grade-point for all
outcomes. This choice is based on the outcome-speciﬁc optimal bandwidths calculated for
the diﬀerent outcomes, all in the range of 0.7 to 1.15,16 as well as inspection of Figure 7. To
have one common bandwidth also eases comparisons of precision.17
In all models I use a triangle kernel function to weight the observations, in practice giving
relatively more weight to observations closer to the cutoﬀ. Finally, as the assignment variable
is discrete there is the risk of introducing a random common component to the variance of all
observations at the same values when we specify our model (Lee and Card, 2008). To correct
for this I follow the recommendation of Lee and Card (2008) and cluster the sampling errors
on these discrete values of the assignment variable.
15With the beneﬁt of getting the standard errors for the estimates directly.
16Optimal bandwidths is calculated using the the Stata procedure rdob implementing the algorithm derived
in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)(Imbens, 2012).
17I assess the sensitivity of my estimates presenting ITT estimates for four other bandwidths, from a
quarter of a grade point on each side of the cutoﬀ to one and a half grade points in Table A.3 below. Further,
Figure A.7 in the appendix shows the LATE estimates and their conﬁdence intervals against a even wider
range of bandwidths. Note also that the bandwidths are asymmetric when larger than 1 grade point, as there
are only students within one grade-point below the cutoﬀ.
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4.3 Assessing the identifying assumption
The continuity assumption (Assumption 1) of the potential outcomes cannot be tested, but
a consequence of the assumption is that baseline covariates should be balanced across the
cutoﬀ (Lee, 2008). If students are able to manipulate their ﬁrst term GPA this should be
revealed by balance tests. A second and more direct way to test for manipulation is to look
at the density of the assignment variable (McCrary, 2008).
4.3.1 Local balance tests
Figure 4 shows how program participation and student characteristics change around the
cutoﬀ in the estimation sample. First, there is a clear discontinuity in program participation
in the upper left plot, which drops from a stable level just below 80 percent to zero. The
ﬁrst requirement (Equation 4) for the design is satisﬁed for this sample.
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Figure 4: Balancing tests: Composition of student characteristics around cutoﬀ
Notes. The ﬁts are the smoothed values from local linear regressions of the ﬁrst term
GPA on participation, characteristics, and the prior achievement. All regressions esti-
mated separately at each side of the the cutoﬀ, weighted with a triangle kernel with a
bandwidth of 1 average grade-point for all outcomes. The cutoﬀ, normalized to zero,
was identiﬁed by the search algorithm at the 11th percentile in the estimation sample.
Student performance, measured by performance on a national test in 8th grade, shows no
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sign of discontinuities. On the other hand there is some indication of diﬀerences in the student
composition with respect to gender and parental education. Table 3, presents estimates of
the diﬀerence in characteristics across the cutoﬀ while varying the bandwidth. For fathers'
average education there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the larger bandwidths, but only at a ten
percent level. With six characteristics this could be by chance, and the Wald test for a joint
diﬀerence in the baseline characteristics is reassuring with a p-value of 0.44 for the preferred
bandwidth.
Table 3: Composition of student characteristics around cutoﬀ, main sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.25 .50 .75 1.00 1.50
Share in program 0.742∗∗ 0.736∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.744∗∗ 0.758∗∗
(0.088) (0.070) (0.062) (0.057) (0.053)
Share female 0.187 0.107 0.092 0.078 0.091
(0.187) (0.119) (0.098) (0.086) (0.075)
Avg. on 8th grade tests -0.287 0.131 0.062 0.006 -0.072
(0.398) (0.203) (0.154) (0.130) (0.110)
Share immigrant -0.124 -0.040 0.025 0.034 0.032
(0.153) (0.089) (0.070) (0.058) (0.049)
Share immigrant parents 0.149 0.025 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013
(0.106) (0.068) (0.058) (0.051) (0.044)
Mother's schooling -1.857 -0.298 -0.976 -0.886 -0.905
(1.919) (1.214) (0.980) (0.837) (0.734)
Father's schooling -2.119 -0.885 -1.270∗ -1.232∗ -1.119∗
(1.392) (0.888) (0.756) (0.664) (0.589)
Observations 171 311 456 608 919
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance, 7.395 2.607 5.062 5.897 7.574
all but 'Share in program'
p-value Wald test 0.286 0.856 0.536 0.435 0.271
Notes. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the discrete values of the assignment variable
in parentheses. Stars indicate the signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05). Data are for the students in
the main estimation sample. Column (1) - (5) presents balance tests for bandwidths of .25 - 1.5 average
grade-points. The cutoﬀ, normalized to zero, was identiﬁed by the search algorithm at the 11th percentile.
For means, standard deviations and explanations of variables see the summary statistics in Table A.1 with
notes.
For the sample of strict schools Table 4 shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
probability of participation across the cutoﬀ. The diﬀerence, however, depends more on the
chosen bandwidth and is smaller (50 percentage points compared to 74 in the main sample
for the preferred bandwidth of one average grade point). Graphic balance tests for this
sample are shown in the appendix in Figure A.6. For the observed characteristics there is a
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signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average education of the students' mothers across the cutoﬀ. This
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level for all presented bandwidths. The joint test is
signiﬁcant at a ten percent level and close to signiﬁcant at a ﬁve percent level, suggesting that
the algorithm might have picked up schools where there was in fact no rule-based assignment
to the program. This suggests a violation of the continuity assumption, such that I cannot
draw credible causal inference from this sample.
Table 4: Composition of student characteristics around cutoﬀs, alt. sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.25 .50 .75 1.00 1.50
Share in program 0.170∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.568∗∗
(0.085) (0.059) (0.047) (0.041) (0.035)
Share female 0.074 0.095 0.051 0.027 0.024
(0.086) (0.062) (0.051) (0.045) (0.039)
Avg. on 8th grade tests 0.044 -0.039 -0.055 -0.096 -0.120∗∗
(0.134) (0.098) (0.080) (0.070) (0.061)
Share immigrant 0.036 0.031 0.038 0.030 0.026
(0.055) (0.042) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026)
Share immigrant parents -0.040 -0.028 -0.030 -0.027 -0.023
(0.056) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.021)
Mother's schooling -1.788∗∗ -1.098∗∗ -1.117∗∗ -0.970∗∗ -0.724∗∗
(0.672) (0.528) (0.443) (0.394) (0.348)
Father's schooling -1.192∗ -1.031∗∗ -0.664 -0.480 -0.322
(0.656) (0.508) (0.425) (0.380) (0.338)
Observations 568 1097 1611 2109 3081
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance, 12.171 12.176 12.667 12.148 11.747
all but 'Share in program'
p-value Wald test 0.058 0.058 0.049 0.059 0.068
Notes. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the discrete values of the assignment variable
in parentheses. Stars indicate the signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05). Data are for the students in the
alternative sample of schools identiﬁed as Quite strict (R-squared>0.5). Column (1) - (5) presents balance
tests for bandwidths of .25 - 1.5 average grade-points. The cutoﬀ, normalized to zero, was identiﬁed by the
search algorithm at the 11th percentile. For means, standard deviations and explanations of variables see
the summary statistics in Table A.1 with notes.
4.3.2 The ﬁrst term GPA distribution
Studying the distribution of the assignment variable in Figure 5 in high resolution (bin width
of 0.05 average grade-points) there does seem to be more mass to the left of cutoﬀ, indicated
by the vertical line. These peaks appear at regular intervals, thus also at values where there
are no incentives for individuals to act strategically. This is explained by the data-generating
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process of the variable: The number of subjects that enter ﬁrst term GPA varies between
individuals, with 12 being by far the most common number. As subject grades are integers,
this will produce heaps at multiples of 1/12. The cutoﬀ identiﬁed in Stavanger, 2.75, is
such a multiple.
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Figure 5: Distribution of ﬁrst term GPA in the estimation sample
Notes. Distribution of the assignment variable for the ﬁrst cohorts in Stavanger with a
bin width of 0.05 ﬁrst-term average grade-points. The vertical lines indicate the located
cutoﬀ at the 11th percentile.
Even in the absence of strategic behavior the bunching in the distribution could cause
problems. Barreca et al. (2011) ﬁnd that (non-random) heaping causes bias in the estimates
of marginal returns to medical care for newborns in Almond et al. (2010).18 Students with 12
grades could be systematically diﬀerent. For one, they are less likely to be deﬁned as special
needs. I therefore follow Barreca et al. (2012) and plot the three potentially problematic
covariates against ﬁrst term GPA in Figure 6. There is no indication of any systematic
diﬀerences between the heaps and the neighboring values.19
18Poorer hospitals are more likely to round oﬀ the birth weight of the newborn babies and thus the
composition of babies at every multiple of a 100 grams are diﬀerent from the neighboring values. The babies
at the cutoﬀ at 1500 grams are thus not comparable to those just above.
19The heaps are closer to the overall average, but this is natural with more observations making up the
average characteristic at these values.
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Figure 6: Covariates vs. assignment
Notes. The y-axes in the top two panels show the number of years of schooling for the
students' mother and father, respectively. The y-axis in the bottom panel shows the
share that is female. The hollow circles show the the characteristic means for bins of
0.01 average grade-points plotted at midpoints, while the x's show the characteristic
means at multiples of 1/12. Linear ﬁts of the characteristics on the ﬁrst-term GPA is
shown in each panel. The vertical lines indicate the cutoﬀ at the 11th percentile.
4.4 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences estimation
An alternative evaluation strategy is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimation at the school
level, exploiting the fact that the program was implemented over three years. Ideally one
would like the introduction of the program to be random. As this was not the case, in order
to draw causal conclusions we have to assume that the trends in average school outcomes
would have been the same in the absence of program implementation in schools included and
schools to be included. This is found to be a fair assumption, at least for a sub-sample of
schools (Eielsen et al., 2013). By comparing how the students' outcomes evolve in the schools
where the program was oﬀered earlier to other schools we can estimate an intention to treat
eﬀect at the school level. Eielsen et al. (2013) present fairly precise estimates showing no
evidence that the intervention has an eﬀect at the school level. Even in the presence of eﬀects
for program participants we could fail to detect an eﬀect at the school level. The potential
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of a sub-group analysis is however limited for the ﬁrst cohorts due to the lack of rule-based
assignment. The problems this creates for a sub-group analysis is further discussed in the
next sub-section.
4.5 Potential spillover eﬀects
One concern is that treatment may aﬀect the students who do not receive intensive train-
ing (the students scoring above the cutoﬀ). Such spillovers may arise if schools reallocate
teachers, essentially shifting resources from the remaining students to the participants. We
saw in section 3.1, however, that participating schools to some degree were compensated
for the increase in teacher demand from the program. Thus the consequence for at least a
substantial part of the students may have been a reduction in class size, and a reduction of
skill heterogeneity in the class, found by Duﬂo et al. (2011) to be important.20 Even if the
teacher hours stayed the same, the average quality of the teachers teaching the remaining
students may have suﬀered, if for instance more motivated or able teachers were used in the
program.
To explore the relative size of direct program eﬀects and the spillover eﬀects we might,
with the availability of data on more cohorts in the program, use a sub-group diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence evaluation. As mentioned above, this is not possible for the ﬁrst cohorts as there
is only a limited number of schools with strict implementation. Still, let us assume for a
moment that this was not the case and only students in the ﬁrst decile participated in the
ﬁrst cohort. We could then compare that quantile in the ﬁrst wave schools with the same
quantile in the remaining schools to get an ITT estimate of the direct eﬀects. Similarly,
comparing the upper 90 percent of the distribution in the ﬁrst wave schools with the same
part of the distribution in other schools would give an estimate of the spillover eﬀects.
In reality participation is not limited to the ﬁrst decile. Figure 1 in Section 3 shows that
there are participating students in the all of the lowest four deciles and thus if we found
eﬀects on the upper 90 percent of the distribution this could be both direct eﬀects of the
program and spillovers eﬀects. So I cannot separate these eﬀects with the available data, but
it is nevertheless important for the overall evaluation of the program; for instance I could fail
to ﬁnd a positive local average treatment eﬀect on the compliers if there is also a positive
spillover eﬀect on the non-participants. In the presence of these potential spillover eﬀects I
can still estimate local treatment eﬀects: the eﬀect of the program on marginal individuals'
outcomes, relative to not being assigned to the program, but still being in a program school.
20Admittedly in a very diﬀerent context: large primary school classes in rural Kenya were randomly divided
in half by previous achievement.
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5 Results
Before discussing the result from the TSLS estimation outlined in Section 4 above, I start
with non-parametrically estimating the intention-to-treat eﬀects. This is done by estimating
local linear regressions at both sides of the cutoﬀs, using the preferred bandwidth of one
average grade-point.
Figure 7 shows the results, and gives a visual preview of the eﬀects of being oﬀered the
program on the achievement and progress outcomes of interest. There is no indication that
the program aﬀected GPA and exam scores, since they vary more or less continuously around
the cutoﬀ. For the outcomes measuring progression there is some indication of negative eﬀects
of the program.
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Figure 7: Average outcomes around estimated cutoﬀ
Notes. The ﬁts are the smoothed values from local linear regressions of the ﬁrst term
GPA on the outcomes, estimated separately at each side of the the cutoﬀ, weighted
with a triangle kernel with a bandwidth of 1 average grade-point for all outcomes. The
cutoﬀ, normalized to zero, was identiﬁed by the search algorithm at the 11th percentile
in the estimation sample.
Column (2) in Table 5 shows the results from reduced form regressions, where treatment
and outcomes are regressed on treatment assignment conditional on the ﬁrst term GPA, as in
Equation (8) in section 4.2. The ﬁrst row shows that there is a strong relationship between
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treatment assignment and actual treatment. At the threshold the probability of being treated
is 74.4 percentage points higher than just above. This eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant, and shows
that the necessary requirement for the design in Equation (4) above is satisﬁed.
The following rows show the reduced form results for the diﬀerent outcomes. Students at
the cutoﬀ are estimated to be on average 2.6 percentage points less likely to enroll on-time
the ﬁrst year of upper secondary than those right above, but this diﬀerence is not precisely
estimated and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. Students at the cutoﬀ is also estimated
to have a 1.7 percentage points lower teacher grade, a 0.159 higher grade-point average on
written exam and be 4.6 percentage points less likely to complete the ﬁrst year of upper
secondary school. None of these estimates are however close to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
Table 5: The local eﬀects of participating in the program on the outcomes of interest (LATE)
(1) (2) (3)
Obs. in bwidth ITT LATE
count b/se b/se
Share of compliers (First stage) 608 0.744∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.000)
GPA teacher grades 607 -0.017 -0.023
(0.049) (0.066)
Written exam grade 581 0.159 0.210
(0.148) (0.194)
On-time enrollment 1st year 608 -0.026 -0.035
(0.028) (0.037)
On-time completion 1st year 608 -0.046 -0.061
(0.085) (0.114)
GPA upper sec. 545 0.135 0.181
(1.313) (1.755)
On-time enrollment 2nd year 608 -0.054 -0.073
(0.073) (0.098)
Notes. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors errors clustered at the discrete values of the assignment
variable in parentheses. Stars indicate the signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05). Data are for the students
in the main estimation sample. Column (1) shows the number of observations for each of the outcome
variables in the estimations with the preferred bandwidth of one grade-point. Column (2) shows the ITT
estimates for the preferred bandwidth. Column (3) shows the LATE estimates, which for the outcomes with
no missing values could be calculated by dividing the ITT with the diﬀerence in probability of treatment (.74).
This probability is slightly diﬀerent for example for the Written exam grade, as the ﬁrst stage estimation
also only include the 581 students for which we observe written exam grades. The cutoﬀ, normalized to zero,
was identiﬁed by the search algorithm at the 11th percentile for the estimation sample. For means, standard
deviations and explanations of variables see the summary statistics in Table A.1 with notes.
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Column (3) shows the LATE estimates from the TSLS estimation of the structural equa-
tion in (10) above, instrumenting for participation with target group membership (being
below the cutoﬀ). These are obtained by dividing the ITT estimates in Column (2) by the
diﬀerence in participation in the ﬁrst row in Column (2)). This yields eﬀect estimates for
the so-called compliers; students who participate in the the program if their ﬁrst grade test
score is below the cutoﬀ but who would not have participated otherwise.
We see that the compliers are 3.5 percentage points less likely to enroll on-time the ﬁrst
year. This estimate is also far from statistically signiﬁcant. Moving down to the ﬁnal row
shows that he compliers at the cutoﬀ are estimated to be 7.3 percentage points less likely to
enroll on time the second year because of the program, but again, the estimate is insigniﬁcant.
Table A.3 in the appendix shows the sensitivity of the ITT estimates for ﬁve diﬀer-
ent bandwidths. Even though participating students are consistently found to have slower
progress than comparable non-participating students, at the current level of precision I can-
not reject the null of no eﬀects. Only for enrollment the ﬁrst year, for a bandwidth of half
a grade-point, is there a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the ten percent level, but with the number of
tests this could very likely be spurious. This interpretation is supported by Figure A.7 in
the appendix that shows that this estimate is highly sensitive to the bandwidth, with the
estimate for a half a grade-point bandwidth being particularly negative.
While I do not ﬁnd evidence of any eﬀect on any of the outcomes studied, I cannot rule
out substantial eﬀects. For example, in Table 5, the standard error on the LATE estimate
for completion of the ﬁrst year of upper secondary is over 11 percentage points which is
about one quarter of a standard deviation in the sample. Similarly the standard error on the
written exam score is .19 grade points, or about one sixth of a standard deviation for this
variable. Thus, any eﬀect would need to be very large in order for me to be able to reject
the null with a sample of this size.
6 Discussion
There are two categories of explanations for why I cannot ﬁnd any eﬀects of the program.
First, the implementation in practice is not suitable for evaluation. Second, the program
may be ineﬀective.
6.1 Program implementation and evaluation
The main diﬃculty in evaluating the policy with the currently available data is that there
are a limited number of schools and municipalities that follow a strict assignment rule. This
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reduces the size of the sample that can be used, and therefore the precision of the estimates.
This is amplied by the fact that only about ten percent of the students in a school are directly
aﬀected by the program. A school level analysis will therefore also have limited statistical
power, as described in Eielsen et al. (2013).21
While currently the analysis relies only on Stavanger, the standard way to increase preci-
sion is to extend the sample to other municipalities or schools that follow a strict assignment.
This was investigated for the current cohort, and did result in more precise estimates but
at the cost of comparability of the treated and untreated students. This could be because
of measurement error in the estimated cutoﬀs as iterating over a large number of units and
speciﬁcations will result in spurious cutoﬀs. Spurious cutoﬀs will lead to noise and may cause
bias in the ﬁnal eﬀect estimates.
However, with data on more cohorts the applicability of the cutoﬀ estimation procedure
may increase.22 With outcome data on additional cohorts there would be two main improve-
ments. First, sample sizes would be larger. Second, cutoﬀs could be more reliably estimated.
More speciﬁcally, if cutoﬀs are persistent over time and spurious cutoﬀs are random events
then we may be able to identify (true) strict schools by selecting only those identiﬁed as strict
over two or three years. The resulting sample of schools should contain fewer false strict
schools. The likelihood of this circumstance and resulting potential bias can be explored with
simulation studies.
Identifying a sample of strict schools could potentially also make possible proper sub-
group analysis with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, and it might be possible to isolate
direct eﬀects from potential spillover eﬀects.
Another reason for the lack of precise results is the likely diﬀerences in the way the
program was implemented between schools. Sletten et al. (2011) do not give information on
the municipality of Stavanger separately, but report substantial variance in the group size
in which the trainings took place for the whole sample. With treatment heterogeneity there
could be both eﬀective and ineﬀective versions of the program canceling each other out.
6.2 Ineﬀective program?
In this evaluation I have not studied the outcome explicitly targeted by the program, gradu-
ation rates, but rather related outcomes associated with completing upper secondary school.
Participating students have not yet completed upper secondary, and grades are not a perfect
21The program only directly aﬀects ten percent of the students in the average school and spillover eﬀects
on the other students are likely limited.
22For this thesis I only have available data on the assignment for two cohorts, and for the outcomes studied,
only for the ﬁrst.
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measure of basic skills. Cortes et al. (2013) study an intensive training program and ﬁnd
that there is an eﬀect on graduation despite a lack of immediate eﬀects on performance. I
cannot rule out this possibility here.
In light of the existing empirical literature it still seems likely that the program has at
best small eﬀects. There is both theory and evidence that suggests that early interventions
are more eﬀective than later remediation (Cunha et al., 2006; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).
Intervening at the end of compulsory school may be too late to make a large impact. Cook
et al. (2014) ﬁnd sizable eﬀects from a program at the high school level, however, and warn
that this conclusion might be premature. They argue that the focus of previous remediation
programs have been wrong and failed to recognize the actual needs of the students that have
fallen behind.
Even if it is not too late to target students at age 16, the focus of the intensive program
studied here might have been too narrowly targeted at basic skills. In the review by Carneiro
and Heckman (2003), non-cognitive skills such as motivation are found to be more easily
malleable at later stages in the life cycle. Moreover, the apparently successful program
studied in Cook et al. (2014) combined non-academic support and individualized academic
remediation and improved expected graduation rates by 14 percentage points for the sample
of disadvantaged high school students in Chicago. This seems like an interesting model, but
it is important to stress that it still remains to been seen if the short-term eﬀects hold up
and can be replicated for diﬀerent samples. Finally regarding the focus of the program, the
remedial education program in Lavy and Schlosser (2005) also targeted improving the self-
image of the students as one of its aims and it achieved 6 percent increase in the graduation
rates.
A ﬁnal reason the program may be ineﬀective is the limited size of the intervention
compared to eﬀective comparable programs. For example, the Ministry does not provide
additional resources, as opposed to De Haan (2012), nor does the intervention (for the ma-
jority) increase the amount of instruction time as in Cortes et al. (2013) where it was doubled.
Rather the intervention involves only changes to the group size and composition, and the
pedagogy.
Still, the limited size of the program makes it a relatively cheap intervention in terms of
costs per treated student. With large returns (to the individual and society) from completing
upper secondary, even small eﬀects can be economically relevant.
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7 Conclusion
I have shown how a search over possible deﬁnitions and values of the ﬁrst term GPA has
successfully recovered the assignment threshold in the ﬁrst term GPA distribution for a
sample of schools. For this sample there is a large diﬀerence in probability of participating
in the program just below and above the cutoﬀ, while the students are otherwise similar.
Comparing the two groups close to the cutoﬀ I ﬁnd no eﬀect estimates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The results are very imprecise, and thus I cannot reject economically interesting
eﬀects. The literature on comparable interventions and the larger literature on skill formation
over the life cycle, however, suggest that the program very well might be ineﬀective. Future
studies that investigate additional cohorts and more years of schooling of existing cohorts
will be able to extend the outcomes investigated and should be able to better identify any
possible eﬀects.
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Figure A.1: Completion upper secondary school within 5 years in Norway, by achievement
deciles of GPA
Notes. The completion rates of upper secondary school within 5 years of ﬁnishing lower
secondary school are plotted by deciles in the achievement distribution at the end of
lower secondary school (as measured by grade point average from the ﬁnal assessment
grades). The shortdashed line at the bottom is the average completion rate for the ten
percent lowest-performing (the ﬁrst decile), which for the 2007-cohort was 16 percent.
The longdashed line is the rate for the top ten percent and was at 96 percent for the
same cohort. The remaining lines, from the bottom up, shows the completion rate
for the 2nd through the 9th decile. The sample consists of all Norwegian students
completing lower upper secondary school in the period 2002-2007.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics estimation sample
Mean SD N
Characteristics
Share female 0.483 0.500 1347
Mother's schooling 13.440 3.771 1301
Father's schooling 13.316 4.131 1276
Share immigrant 0.041 0.198 1347
Share immigrant parents 0.047 0.211 1347
Prior achievement
GPA 1st term 3.829 0.783 1334
Math grade 1st term 3.407 1.147 1309
Norwegian grade 1st term 3.673 0.918 1309
Avg. on 8th grade tests 0.085 0.883 1310
Achievement
GPA teacher grades 4.048 0.832 1343
Written exam grade 3.666 1.145 1305
On-time enrollment 1st year 0.982 0.132 1345
On-time completion 1st year 0.819 0.386 1345
GPA upper sec. 38.554 9.157 1265
On-time enrollment 2nd year 0.850 0.357 1345
Notes. GPA 1st term is the average of all grades (for most students this is 12 grades) set by the students'
teachers at the end of the ﬁrst term of 10th grade. Math and Norwegian grades make up two of the grades
in GPA 1st term. Avg. on 8th grade tests is the average of three standardized grades from a national
exam in 8th grade in English, Norwegian and Maths. Mother's and Father's schooling is the number of
years of schooling of the mother and father of the student, respectively. Share female/immigrant/immigrant
parents are all dummy variables equal to one if the student is female, a immigrant or have immigrant parents,
respectively. The enrollment and completion variables equals one if the student has enrolled our completed,
respectively; zero otherwise. GPA teacher grades is the average of all grades (for most 13 grades) set by the
students' teachers at the end of lower secondary school (10th grade). Written exam grade is the average of
the three exams most students undertake in English, Maths and Norwegian. GPA upper sec. is the average
of all grades the ﬁrst year of upper secondary school multiplied by ten.
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Table A.2: Comparison of participants and other students in estimation sample
(1) (2) (3)
Participants Non-participants Diﬀerence
mean/sd mean/sd b/se
GPA 1st term 2.451 3.921 -1.470∗∗
(0.343) (0.786) (0.039)
Missing grades 1st term 0.008 0.010 -0.001
(0.092) (0.098) (0.009)
Math grade 1st term 1.912 3.548 -1.637∗∗
(0.576) (1.085) (0.063)
Norwegian grade 1st term 2.411 3.791 -1.380∗∗
(0.578) (0.853) (0.060)
Avg. on 8th grade tests -1.009 0.186 -1.195∗∗
(0.616) (0.834) (0.063)
Share female 0.398 0.491 -0.092∗
(0.492) (0.500) (0.047)
Mother's schooling 10.514 13.702 -3.188∗∗
(4.477) (3.589) (0.445)
Father's schooling 11.277 13.491 -2.214∗∗
(3.225) (4.154) (0.343)
Share immigrant 0.161 0.029 0.132∗∗
(0.369) (0.169) (0.034)
Share immigrant parents 0.093 0.042 0.051∗
(0.292) (0.201) (0.027)
Observations 118 1229 1347
Notes. Data are for the main estimation sample. Mean values of each characteristic is shown in column (1)
and (2) for participants and non-participants, respectively; standard deviations are in parentheses. Column
(3) tests each diﬀerence with a Welch's t-test, allowing for the diﬀerence in sample size and variance; standard
errors are in parentheses; stars indicate the signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05).
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Figure A.2: Pupils in wave 1 schools
Notes. The histogram shows the ﬁrst term grade distribution of all students, while the
graphed Epanechnikov kernel density estimation shows the same distribution for only
students participating.
37
05
10
15
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
ls
5 10 15 20 25 30
Percentiles GPA 1st term
School level
0
2
4
6
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s
5 10 15 20 25 30
Percentiles GPA 1st term
Municipality level
Figure A.3: Percentiles identiﬁed as cutoﬀs
Notes. Histograms shows the number of times the percentiles from the 5th to the 30th
were identiﬁed as cutoﬀs for schools and municipalities. The percentiles are from the
speciﬁcation that best explain program participation.
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Figure A.4: Course combinations
Notes. The histograms shows the number of times diﬀerent grade combinations were
found to be the best assignment variable, as identiﬁed by the search procedure.
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Figure A.5: Degree of strict assignment
Notes. Histograms shows the frequencies of the R-squared from the best speciﬁcations
found with search procedure.
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Figure A.6: Composition of student characteristics around cutoﬀ for alt. sample
Notes. The ﬁts are the smoothed values from local linear regressions of the ﬁrst term
GPA on participation, characteristics, and the prior achievement. All regressions esti-
mated separately at each side of the the cutoﬀ, weighted with a triangle kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.5 average grade-point for all outcomes. The assignment variable ﬁrst
term GPA is normalized to zero.
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Figure A.7: Dependence on choice of bandwidth
Notes. Graphs of estimates (with 95% conﬁdence intervals) versus bandwidths for all
six outcome variables. Data are for the main estimation sample.
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Table A.3: The local eﬀects of being oﬀered the program on the outcomes of interest (ITT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.25 .50 .75 1.00 1.50
GPA teacher grades -0.036 -0.035 -0.026 -0.017 -0.011
(0.110) (0.068) (0.057) (0.049) (0.042)
Written exam grade 0.015 0.235 0.279∗ 0.159 0.034
(0.351) (0.200) (0.166) (0.149) (0.133)
On-time enrollment 1st year -0.034 -0.058∗ -0.043 -0.026 -0.010
(0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
On-time completion 1st year -0.104 -0.049 -0.085 -0.046 -0.038
(0.210) (0.121) (0.098) (0.085) (0.073)
GPA upper sec. -1.150 -0.462 -0.160 0.135 -0.089
(3.719) (1.927) (1.533) (1.317) (1.130)
On-time enrollment 2nd year -0.005 -0.032 -0.056 -0.054 -0.038
(0.192) (0.098) (0.082) (0.073) (0.064)
Observations 171 311 456 608 919
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance 1.398 5.556 6.630 3.011 0.890
p-value Wald test 0.966 0.475 0.356 0.807 0.989
Notes. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the discrete values of the assignment variable
in parentheses. Stars indicate the signiﬁcance level (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05). Data are for the students in
the main estimation sample. Column (1) - (5) presents ITT estimates for bandwidths of .25 - 1.5 average
grade-points. The cutoﬀ, normalized to zero, was identiﬁed by the search algorithm at the 11th percentile
for the estimation sample. For means, standard deviations and explanations of variables see the summary
statistics in Table A.1 with notes.
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